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Does Information Lead to Household Electricity Conservation? 
Devon Kristiansen 
Advisor: Sarah West 
Macalester Economics Department  
  
This paper estimates the effect of information on residential electricity consumption.   
Household reading expenditure, education level of the household head, and state “green” 
electricity pricing program participation rate represent the probability that a household has 
encountered information relating the carbon emission externalities of energy consumption and 
human-driven climate change.  Reading expenditure has a significant negative effect on 
household electricity consumption. Initial increases in educational attainment increase 
electricity consumption, but education beyond high school reduces it. The predicted social norm 
effect of green pricing participation is insignificant. 
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Does Information Lead to Household Electricity Conservation? 
I. Introduction 
In the late 1980’s, scientists raised the possibility of human-driven climate change.  First 
attempts to publicize findings failed to motivate the public, perhaps because an average 
worldwide temperature increase of several degrees Celsius did not seem significant to laypeople.  
Public interest only grew after Congressional hearings and an Environmental Protection Agency 
report made headlines in the New York Times, for example, “The Heat is On: Calculating the 
Consequences of a Warmer Earth” from 1988.  From then on, media was the most prominent 
source of climate change information.  Human-driven atmospheric changes truly captivated 
public interest during the internationally coordinated effort to solve ozone depletion in the late 
1980’s (Weart 2008).   
Public concern about climate change has been noticeable enough to prompt public 
opinion polls since the 1990’s.  Though concern has deviated over time around a relatively 
constant mean, the majority of Americans express concern about global warming, a testament to 
the effectiveness of the information from scientists broadcast through the media (see Figure 1).  
Another significant trend in public opinion polls is the decline in the proportion of respondents 
who are uninformed or are unsure about the existence of climate change, which indicates that 
awareness has risen, but some individuals choose not to believe the evidence they have 
encountered.  Yet, according to a Gallup poll in 2008, more than 80 percent of respondents claim 
that they have made either minor or major changes in their lifestyle to protect the environment, 
of which 10 percent report conserving electricity. 
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In addition to conservation behaviors such as reducing vehicle use, conserving electricity 
is a common adaptation for households that understand the impacts of greenhouse gas emissions 
from electricity generation.  Yet not all households prioritize energy conservation.  In order to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions to mitigate consequences of climate change, the effectiveness 
of information provision must be understood separately from price mechanisms.  My paper 
estimates household electricity demand using the Consumer Expenditure Survey of 2005 to 
isolate the change in electricity consumption associated with household exposure to climate 
change information. 
In section two I review the economic literature to construct a strong specification model 
for electricity demand, to develop theory based on previous studies about energy conservation, 
and the role of information in consumer behavior.  I discuss my theory in section three, present 
my data and regression results in section four, and conclude with the findings and implications of 
my paper in section five. 
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II. Literature Review 
Nearly all empirical studies on household demand for electricity are based on the models 
of Houthhakker (1951) and Fisher and Kaysen (1962).  Houthakker (1951) calculates elasticities 
of demand of residential electricity in Great Britain to evaluate the effect of an imposition of 
two-part tariffs.  His study emphasizes the statistical irrelevance of the average price as the 
independent variable, and instead uses marginal prices of kilowatt-hours as the more significant 
determinant of electricity consumption.1  The model also includes household income, the price of 
a substitute energy good (natural gas), and the ownership of complementary electricity 
consuming appliances.  The study does not attempt to explain the heterogeneity of appliance 
holdings across households, which Dubin and McFadden (1984) later prove problematic because 
preferences for electricity use are correlated with appliance choice.  Houthakker finds an 
elasticity of demand coefficient of -0.89 based on household surveys from 1937-1939.  The 
demand for electricity in the present might be expected to be more inelastic, as we have become 
more dependent on a broader portfolio of electricity-consuming appliances while electricity has 
decreased as a portion of total expenditure. 
Another foundational paper models the distinctions between long term and short term 
elasticity of demand (Fisher and Kaysen 1962).  The main difference between the long and short 
run is the weaker effect of the substitute energy good price in the short term. Substitution of 
natural gas for electricity, while holding household services constant, requires a change in the 
appliance portfolio, which only occurs in the long run.  My paper draws only from the short run 
specification because I use an essentially cross-sectional dataset. A weakness of Fisher and 
                                                          
1
 Marginal price is the price of consuming the next kilowatt hour, which differs from average price under declining 
or inclining block rates.  Due to data constraints, I will not be able to use marginal price in this analysis.    At the 
time of Houthakker’s study, households typically faced declining rate structures.  However, utilities in the US today 
typically chare inclining rate structures.  According to Houthakker (1951), the omission biases my results towards 
from zero because households may be facing a higher marginal price than the average price. 
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Kaysen is their use of aggregate electricity consumption as the dependent variable, income per 
capita, and appliance portfolio of a community rather than data from individual households, due 
to data limitations.  Their estimates for price elasticity by state range from 0.14 to -0.94.  The 
wide range might be explained by their use of aggregate dependent and independent variables. 
Through the 1970’s, the energy crisis brought a resurgence of interest in the elasticity of 
demand for residential energy consumption to understand the implications of energy price spikes 
or electricity rationing.  Anderson (1973), Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan (1974), and 
Halvorsen (1975) build on the earlier literature.  Anderson (1973) acknowledges the weaknesses 
in the aggregate model of Fisher and Kaysen (1962) and provides a framework to estimate the 
price elasticities of demand in California and then the United States using household data and the 
marginal prices of declining rate structures and other factors that vary by state, for example 
cooling index days and the percent of “all-electric” homes in the state.  The estimated elasticities 
using 1969 data range from -0.58 to -0.77, which is an improvement in precision from Fisher and 
Kaysen (1962). In addition to the effect of disaggregation, their results might also differ from 
Houthakker because of the unobserved differences in preferences between Great Britain and the 
US and several decades of technological change.  These studies inform my theoretical approach 
by supporting the significance of a number of essential control variables, for example heating 
and cooling days and the price of an energy alternative. 
Dubin and McFadden (1984) reveal an essential error in the existing literature of the time.  
They explain a bias in price elasticity of demand estimates without a correction for the 
correlation between appliance choice and the error term.  The household’s unobserved 
preferences determine both the appliance purchase choice and the intensity of electricity use.  
For example, a household with strong preferences for cool indoor air is more likely to purchase 
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an air conditioner and to use it heavily in the summer months.  Dubin and McFadden suggest 
three strategies to correct for this error: instrumental variables, a reduced-form method that 
enters predicted probabilities of appliance purchase directly in the estimation of electricity 
demand, and the conditional expectation correction method.  Without sufficient time or 
background in these methods, my paper will not control for selectivity bias, but will interpret the 
results with skepticism knowing the existence of the distortion.   
My paper asks whether or not information about climate change induces households to 
voluntarily reduce electricity consumption.  Voluntary conservation results from disutility from 
each unit of electricity used.  Jacobsen et al. (2011) hypothesizes that energy consumption causes 
disutility, or reduction of satisfaction through consumption, in conserving households, but 
disutility is absent in households whose behavior is unaffected by messages about climate 
change. The disutility arises from discomfort and awareness that energy generation produces 
greenhouse gases that contribute to human-driven climate change.  The household avoids 
disutility by voluntarily participating in a minimum buy-in renewable energy offset program 
instead of changing the intensity of household energy consumption.  This phenomenon is 
described as a “private provision of a public good” because while the private cost of purchasing 
energy offsets is significant, the marginal social benefit of the behavior change is negligible.   
The paper found that participating households, on net, consumed more with the green 
electricity program.  This result indicates that the cost to the household to buy in to the program 
was less than the cost of disutility from perceived household contribution to carbon emissions.  
To the household’s utility function, the cost of switching to renewable sources of energy negates 
the marginal disutility per kilowatt, and the household consumes according to the market cost of 
a kilowatt. 
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Kotchen and Moore (2008) investigate a renewable energy offset program with a green-
tariff mechanism, an additional cost for each unit of electricity, rather than voluntary 
contribution at or above the minimum buy-in amount, as studied by Jacobsen et al (2011).  
Instead of net increases in electricity consumption, Kotchen and Moore found that households 
consumed less, but were unable to determine if it was a price effect or a conservation effect.  
Kotchen and Moore’s model and the findings of Jacobsen et al. provide support for the effect of 
climate change awareness on electricity consumption through the effect of disutility as an 
internalized cost.     
Reiss and White (2008) found evidence of voluntary conservation in households as a 
result of education campaigns during an energy crisis in California in 2000.  The significant 
response within a short period after a well-orchestrated public appeal campaign, even during a 
period of price caps, suggests that households change their energy intensity behaviors in 
response to a change in information in the short run without changes in the appliance portfolio.  
Literature on the economics of voluntary contributions to a public goods (or reductions of public 
“bads”) can offer support that the results of Reiss and White (2008), Kotchen and Moore (2008), 
and Jacobsen et al. (2011) are consistent with rational consumer behavior.  Andreoni (1990) and 
Andreoni (1995) frame voluntary charitable contributions as a form of impure altruism because 
individual utility functions not only consider the tradeoff of private consumption for 
contributions to a public good, but because individuals also derive utility from the public good.   
My paper instead explains the role of information in changing residential electricity 
demand, as seen in Reiss and White (2008).  I assume that households have preferences that 
cause them to have variable likelihood of exposure to climate change information, and might 
respond differently to the same information. Instead of the common approach in the literature, I 
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hypothesize that households perceive reductions in electricity usage as preventing contributions 
to a public bad rather than voluntary reduction as a contribution to a public good.  The disutility 
reduces the overall marginal benefit of electricity, and results in electricity conservation.   
The use of education and readership as indicators of information exposure is used by 
Shimshack et al. (2007) to predict the likelihood that households alter fish consumption in 
response to mercury advisories.  Shimshack et al. uses education based on the hypothesis in 
Grossman (1972) that an individual improves his/her ability to process information with 
additional levels of education.  Shimshack et al. also assumes that information, if concentrated in 
news media, will be accessed at a lower acquisition cost for households who read news sources 
regularly.  Their findings demonstrate that information presented in the media affects consumer 
behavior. 
Academic research in psychology suggests that climate change mitigation activities are 
motivated by economic incentives, moral obligation, social norms, and information, and 
emphasize that non-price mechanisms can have just as significant an impact as taxes or other 
economic approaches (Whitmarsh 2009, Allcott and Mullainathan 2010).  One study in particular 
discovered misconceptions about effective climate change mitigation strategies. For instance, 
recycling was perceived to be effective and thus was the most frequently reported environmental 
action taken by households (Whitmarsh 2009).  The study suggested that improved information 
could significantly change the impact of intentional environmental behaviors.  
Informed by previous studies in electricity estimation, conservation, and information, I 
next derive for the effect of information in a representative household’s utility function.  
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III. Theory 
In this section, I present a simple model that demonstrates the effect of a change in 
information on the utility maximization decision in a household.  The model most closely relates 
to household electricity conservation models of Kotchen and Moore (2008) and Jacobsen et al. 
(2011), but differs specifically because I omit the public good of conservation from the utility 
function.  I assume that individuals within a household have homogenous preferences, the 
purchase choice of a durable is predetermined, and increases in information have a negative 
effect on the marginal utility of electricity consumption because the household incurs guilt for 
perceived contributions to negative externalities through electricity use and carbon emissions.  
The information parameter  δ  encompasses factual knowledge of electricity generation 
externalities and informal social pressures to advertising conservation campaigns, either for 
environmental reasons or for energy crises response, such as the one described in Reiss and 
White (2008). 
Households choose the level of electricity to consume through appliance durables and 
derive utility from the household services provided by the electricity consumptive appliances.  A 
representative household maximizes its utility subject to a budget constraint.   Utility is a 
function determined by household services  h , all other consumer goods  x , and the total 
disutility associated with the level electricity consumption,  E   multiplied by the function  d(δ) , 
which is the average disutility per kilowatt hour.  Household services are determined by the 
parameters  E, electricity use in kilowatt hours, and by the appliance portfolio they own,  D.  
Household services are not discounted because they represent consumption within one time 
period.  
 U
 
= U( h(E, D),Ed(δ), x)                 (1) 
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 Electricity use of the household is determined by: 
E = E(H, D, C, PE, PS, Y)                 (2) 
  The endogeniety problem described by Dubin and McFadden (1984) is evident here in 
Equation (1), because the purchase decision for  D 
 
is determined by household characteristics 
vector H, which also is a parameter in the demand for electricity, which is described in Equation 
(2).  The vector H includes characteristics relevant to electricity consumption such as education 
level, age, and number of household members, energy efficiency, location, and type of household 
structure, and unobservable preferences.  Household utility is also affected by a degree of 
disutility associated with each unit of electricity.  The functional form of d(δ) is uncertain, but it 
is reasonable to assume that  d(δ)  is never positive and  

  is less than zero.  A household 
experiences decreases in marginal utility as they internalize information about negative 
externalities of electricity consumption, but at a certain threshold of understanding, additional 
information’s effect on utility is diminishing.  For the purposes of this model, d(δ) is exogenous, 
meaning that the household cannot choose the level of information available to them or how 
information affects their utility. 
Other factors of electricity demand (as seen in equation 2) are climate C, the price of a 
kilowatt-hour PE, the price of a substitute for electricity2 PS, and household income Y.    
The household’s optimization problem is defined as: 
max,	,
 Φ = U[ h(E | D), Ed(δ), x] + λ(Y – PE E –Px x)                       (3) 
                                                          
2
 The literature consistently chooses natural gas prices because natural gas is a close substitute for electricity as an 
input for household services.  See Houthakker (1951), Fisher and Kaysen (1962), Anderson (1973), Houthakker, 
Verleger, and Sheehan (1974), and Halvorsen (1975). 
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The budget constraint is income minus the expenditures on electricity and all other goods.  
The household utility maximization equation (3) is the utility function subjected to the budget 
constraint, and is characterized by the first order conditions (4a), (4b), and (4c). 


  







    0                 (4a) 

	
  

	
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The first order condition (4a) for the marginal utility of electricity reveals the effect of a 
change in information to the amount of electricity consumed by the household.  To explore the 
effect of a change in  δ, (4a) is rearranged to obtain: 








 


                 (5) 
The first term in brackets represents the change in utility with respect to a change in 
electricity due to the positive impact of electricity use on the level of household services.  The 
combination of this term with the marginal disutility of electricity, which is the second term in 
the brackets, represents the marginal benefit in utils of an additional kilowatt hour, which is then 
converted by the inverse of  λ , the marginal utility of income, to dollar units.  The right-hand 
side is the marginal cost in dollars per kilowatt hour.  The impact of a change in information 
increases the magnitude of the marginal disutility with respect to a change in electricity.  When 
there is an increase in information (and  d(δ)  becomes a larger negative value), the marginal 
benefits decrease relative to the marginal cost at the original level of consumption. The 
household must compensate by reducing the level of electricity consumption to maximize utility. 
Though the simple model assumes a representative household, in a more accurate model, 
each household responds differently to the same level of information.  For example, many 
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American households are skeptical of the existence of negative externalities from fossil fuel 
consumption (which is the dominant source of generated electricity).  Thus, this model assumes 
the information parameter is internalized.  A household with both  d(δ)  and   

  equal to zero 
indicates that they have no information or do not internalize information so they do not 
experience disutility as a result of electricity consumption. 
IV. Data 
a. Ideal Data 
To test this paper’s hypothesis, the ideal data would be drawn from a survey of household 
electricity consumption that includes a quantifiable measurement for a household’s exposure to 
messages about climate changes (which could take the form of current event reading or 
frequency of watching news coverage on TV) as well as a measurement of the degree to which 
the household internalizes these messages.  For example, this observation would indicate 
whether the individual is consciously aware of externalities as they utilize household appliances.  
This measure would ideally combine the extent of accurate knowledge of carbon dioxide 
emissions and the emotional effect on utility, and the values would be gathered over time and 
across households to isolate changing prices and changing awareness.  In addition these 
explanatory variables, the survey would include time spent at home, income, education, house 
characteristics (as they apply to the energy efficiency of the home), average temperature for the 
month, location of the household, number of appliances owned and the efficiency ratings of each, 
and the full range of demographic factors, such as number of individuals of the household. 
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In addition to a measure of environmental consciousness, I would need an indicator of 
energy intensity preferences to correct selectivity bias of appliances, as well as a way to control 
for education's role in selectivity bias. 
b. Actual Data 
 Unfortunately, the ideal data is not fully available.  Instead, this paper uses the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX), a survey performed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to document 
trends in American consumption patterns. The 2005 CEX, which includes data for five 
consecutive quarters beginning with the first quarter of 2005, interviewed households about their 
expenditures for the current month and the previous three months, as well as a number of 
household characteristics, including education of household head, income, family structure, 
housing tenure, appliance holdings, and other data.   Information about households was collected 
although there are no measures beyond square footage, the year the house was built, and number 
of rooms to describe the household characteristics of energy efficiency.  In the case that the 
household uses air conditioning in the summer months and the insulation is poor, the electric bill 
will be significantly higher than a household that exhibits the same behavior of using air 
conditioning in a more efficiently constructed home.  More importantly, there is no direct survey 
question to measure the awareness of climate change.   
The five quarters were separate data sets, so they have been appended together so that 
each household for each quarter appears as a new observation.  In the regression analysis, I 
cluster by household to correct standard errors for correlations in within household electricity 
consumption across quarters. 
I derive kilowatt hours of electricity consumed per quarter from the CEX electricity 
expenditure data by matching a rolling average by quarter of monthly prices per kilowatt hour by 
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state according to the month that the household was interviewed.  I obtain the price data from the 
Energy Information Administration.  Dividing the expenditure by the rolling average provides a 
rough estimate for the number of kilowatt hours consumed.  Electricity expenditure is not a 
satisfactory dependent variable because of wide variations in average price by state.  For instance, 
two households facing different prices may have the same expenditure, but consume 
significantly different levels of electricity.  The price of a substitute energy good, natural gas, 
was also taken from the Energy Information Administration and matched to the month that the 
household was interviewed by rolling average.  I gather heating and cooling degree day data by 
state to control for fluctuations in weather from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration.  I match these data to each observation by quarter and by state. Lastly, I obtain 
the 2005 count of participants in voluntary green pricing programs from the Energy Information 
Administration, and I derive green pricing participation rates by dividing the number of 
participants by the state population found from the US Census. 
I use reading material expenditure as a proxy for exposure to and awareness of messages 
about climate change, following the example of Shimshack (2007).  If a household has been 
presented with information about climate change through formal education or from reading 
published media, the utility maximization decision will occur at a lower level of electricity 
consumption for a comparable household with less information.  Because of education increases 
information processing, the household head education level is controlled for in the model. Thus, 
the null hypothesis is that education and readership have no impact on household electricity 
consumption, whereas the alternative hypothesis is that these two factors will be estimated with 
negative coefficients.  A third proxy for information is the percent of the population who 
voluntary participate in green pricing programs through their electric utility.  I match the 
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participation rate to each household according to state.  Green pricing participation is an 
indication of households making a discrete decision to voluntarily face a higher price to reduce 
electricity use.  The motivation for which might be assumed to be for environmental concerns 
because of the intentional name “green pricing program”.  A higher participation rate within a 
state increases the likelihood that a household in the sample is affected by a social norm pressure 
to conserve as described by Hunt and Allcott (2010).  Social norms facilitate behavior change 
because individuals believe that crowds have better information about the benefits of a particular 
action. 
Interaction terms between reading and education levels should return negative 
coefficients increasing in magnitude with higher levels of education because a greater potential 
for processing information will amplify the responsiveness of an individual to information about 
climate change. 
I include a series of household characteristics to control for variation in electricity 
consumption not related to my variables of interest. Dummy variables for region capture 
unobserved differences in the social norms of electricity usage common to neighboring groups of 
states.  Tenure is a dummy variable which is equal to one when the household owns the 
residence and is equal to zero when they rent or reside without payment. Whether a household 
owns the home, whether it is through a mortgage or not, is expected to have a negative impact on 
electricity consumption because householders would have more incentive to invest in insulation 
or other electricity saving methods as opposed to renters.  I include dummy variables for the 
population of the household’s city because access to substitute energy goods differs between 
rural and urban locations (Labandeira et al. 2005).  For this sample, I include five indicator 
18 
 
dummy variables for the population size of the city where the household is located.3  Urban 
households also may be more likely to use electricity less intensively compared to rural dwellers 
because of non-random differences in residence structure, income, education, or appliance 
portfolio.   
Number of family members and number of rooms are expected to have a positive effect 
on electricity consumption.  It is also important to include a term for the number of rooms 
squared.  The squared term for rooms captures increasing costs to heat or cool an additional 
room until the ratio of outside surface area to volume decreases to the point of decreasing 
marginal cost for each additional room.  Age is also supplemented by a squared term to describe 
the trajectory of appliance accumulation with age, and then a decrease in use intensity as children 
leave and household heads age.  I expect a generational component to climate change awareness.    
Messages about human-driven climate change have been met with much skepticism in older 
people while generally accepted more readily by the younger generation, so there might be a 
positive linear trend between electricity consumption and age.  I also included the age of the 
building to proxy for energy efficiency, expecting that newer homes would be more energy 
efficient 
c. Summary Statistics 
 To assess the basic characteristics of my sample before the estimation model, below I 
present summary statistics (Table 1).  Out of the total 54633 observations in the dataset, 29729 
are usable.  I exclude households that reported negative total expenditures, in addition to 
households that reported zero expenditure on electricity for the time period because their 
                                                          
3
 The categorical variable designed by the CEX includes an indicator for households in cities with the following 
ranges of population size: More than 4 million, 1.20-4 million, 0.33-1.19 million, 125-329.9 thousand, and less than 
125,000. 
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response to price and disutility are unobservable and irrelevant to the hypothesis.  Also, between 
four thousand and five thousand observations do not report the household’s state.  One model 
also tests the robustness of the results when excluding all states to which observations were re-
coded.  In this sample, kilowatt hours consumed has a large standard deviation.  For example, the 
most consumption by one household was 38,249 kilowatt hours, compared to the least, or 5.98 
kilowatt hours. The large variation provides an opportunity to explain variation in consumption 
patterns in conjunction with other information reported by the consumer unit. 
The sample represents a varied composition of households according to the categorical 
variable of household head’s education level (see the dummy variable means for education levels 
in Table 1).  The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports of educational attainment from the year 2005 
lend credibility to the representative distribution of the sample compared to the national 
distribution of education.   
However, the sample is biased towards urban households.  The US Census defines urban 
areas as cities with more than 50,000 residents, and that 80 percent of the United States 
population lived in an urban area in the decade between 2000 and 2010.  However, more than 90 
percent of my sample lives in cities greater than 100,000, so my sample over-represents 
households in urban areas.   
Total reported expenditure was used rather than the household’s income because 
expenditure better represents the household’s budget constraint.  A considerable number of 
observations in the complete dataset report zero or negative income and still have positive 
expenditures in reading materials, in electricity, and overall.  Presumably the contradiction 
occurs for individuals receiving welfare, using savings or some source of income not reported in 
the Survey.  Slesnick (2001) argues that income is a less than ideal measure of household 
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consumption and welfare, especially in the short run.  For a narrow time period, households may 
appear to have vastly different standards of living if income is the indicator, but they might have 
comparable levels of consumption if they are merely at different stages in the life cycle and 
smoothing consumption.  
In summary, a full analysis controlling for the crucial variables such as household 
demographics and characteristics, education, and total expenditure will return a negative 
coefficient for electricity consumption for the variable of readership expenditure and possibly for 
education.   
V. Results 
a.  Estimation Equation 
The predictions of the theoretical model are tested by an empirical equation that explains 
variation in electricity consumption by reading expenditure.  Reading expenditure, controlling 
for education level, increases the likelihood that a household is exposed to information about the 
externalities of electricity production.  Education could indicate a greater sensitivity to climate 
change information because higher levels of education would improve an individual’s ability to 
process information, and result in a greater degree of internalization of climate change messages 
in the media (Shimshack 2007, Grossman 1972).  A third explanatory variable, the percentage of 
the state population who voluntarily participates in green electricity pricing programs, is an 
indication of the social norms within a state with regard to conservation.  The resulting ordinary 
least squares estimation specification is Equation 6. 
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ln(kilowatt hours) = β0  + β1ln(kilowatt hour price) + β2 ln(total expenditure) + β3  
ln(natural gas price) + β4 ln(reading expenditure) + β5 E(vector of education variables) + β6  
heating degree days + β7 cooling degree days + β8  housing tenure + β9 age of building + β10 
number of rooms + β11  number of rooms squared + β12  family size + β13  age of household head 
+ β14  age squared + β15  vector of community size indicators + β16  vector of region indicators + 
β17  vector of electric appliance indicators + β18 ε             (6) 
Several models are presented to assess the relevance of a number of potential factors for 
residential electricity consumption that must be controlled for to isolate the predicted effect of 
the three main explanatory variables.  I estimate a log-log relationship between the dependent 
variable (kilowatt hours) and the independent variables (electricity price, total expenditure, price 
of natural gas, and reading expenditure).4  
b. Regression Results and Discussion 
My first model uses the basic specification equation to estimate the effect of reading 
expenditure on kilowatt hours, controlling for education level of the household head.  Model 2 
includes interaction terms between each level of education dummy variable and reading, plus and 
interaction term between reading and household head age.  I add green pricing participation rate 
to proxy social norm effects of conservation in my third model.  In the last two models, 4 and 5, I 
introduce a change in specification by incorporating state and quarter fixed effects instead of 
heating and cooling degree days and also a model that drops any state that has been re-coded or a 
state to which re-coded states have been assigned.5  I remove temperature days and regions from 
                                                          
4
 I performed a Box-Cox regression for each of the variables, and the log likelihood coefficient theta is significant to 
the 0.001 level for each. 
5
 The recorded value for state is recoded for some households for privacy reasons.  All states that were re-coded 
from or to are dropped in Model 5 to eliminate any possibility of incorrect matching of kilowatt hour or natural gas 
prices. 
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Models 4 and 5 because, by definition, these two variables are perfectly correlated with the state 
dummy variables and would otherwise be redundant.  State-fixed effects capture state-specific 
unobservable cultural preferences for electricity use that are omitted in the first three models.   
In each of the five models I regress while clustering for the same household, rather than 
using each reported quarter as a separate observation, to account for correlation across 
observations of the same household.  The entire dataset has 17,244 households, but my usable 
subsample includes 9,520 households and 29,729 total observations. 
Each of the control variables discussed above were consistently significant and of the 
expected sign, with the exception of tenure.  The estimate for tenure was positive, which 
indicated that homeowners tend to consume more electricity than renters.  A potential 
explanation could be that the predicted effect of a homeowner’s financial incentive to invest in 
energy efficiency was overwhelmed by the tendency for owned residences having more rooms 
than rented apartments.6  The sign of the coefficient for the age of the building was inconsistent 
between positive and negative and never significant.  Perhaps the state of repair, rather than the 
age of the house, better determines the energy efficiency.   
The population size indicator variables exhibit a pattern in which households in cities of 
more than 4 million or 0.33-1.19 million on average consume 3 percent fewer kilowatt hours 
than the reference population size indicator (below 125 thousand).7  A simple multi-collinearity 
test showed a tendency for households in cities of than 4 million or 0.33-1.19 million to be less 
likely to own their home and more likely to have fewer rooms.  However, the population size 
indicators all have weak, if any, significance. 
                                                          
6
 According to a multicollinearity test of the sample. 
7
 The calculation for all semi-log percentage estimates is given by  !  "#$%/'   1 where c is the estimated 
coefficient and V is the estimated variance of c (Kennedy 1981, Anderson and West 2006). 
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Models without state fixed effects are estimated with indicators for region and heating 
and cooling degree days.  While the Northeast is insignificant, potentially because of the wide 
variation in household characteristics across a densely populated region, while the positive 
coefficient on South is highly significant, presumably because of the social norm of intensely 
using air conditioning in hot summers.  The coefficient on South suggests that, on average, 
Southern households consume 40 percent more electricity than Western households, which is the 
reference region, controlling for all other variables in the model. 
Across the first three models, the price elasticity of demand is -0.40 or -0.41, which is 
within the range for short term residential demand found by Houthakker, Verleger, and Sheehan 
(1974), but slightly more inelastic than the short run estimates Fisher and Kaysen (1962), who 
include fewer household control variables, for instance, the number of rooms.   My model 
explains variation in household electricity use more precisely with the addition of household 
variables, and reveals that price elasticity of demand for electricity is even more inelastic than 
the early literature’s estimation.  After controlling for selection bias, Dubin and McFadden (1984) 
estimate that price elasticity of residential demand for electricity is within a range of -0.197 to -
0.310, depending on the household appliance portfolio and type of selection bias correction, 
which is even more inelastic than my estimation.  The addition of state fixed effects changes the 
price elasticity to -0.37, and the last model estimated price elasticity to be -0.78.  If the number 
of recoded observations were significant, the dropping of all recoded states might have 
eliminated incorrectly matched prices and the model could be estimating a coefficient closer to 
the true value.  Because of the need to drop heating and cooling degree days because they 
correspond directly to state dummy variables, I still control for general seasonality of electricity 
use by introducing quarter fixed effects. 
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The cross price elasticity of the substitute across the models ranges between 0.11 and 
0.41, becoming more responsive with state fixed effects and state drops, like the own price 
elasticity.  The relative inelasticity reflects the imperfect substitutability of natural gas and 
electricity in the short run, for example, the capital cost of replacing an electric heating system 
for a natural gas system, or the problem of access for some households.  The income elasticity 
(0.21 - 0.23) is positive and very inelastic, which indicates that electricity is a normal good and a 
necessity.   
Model 1 estimates the effect of all controls and the main explanatory variable log of 
reading materials expenditure. The significant but small coefficient on the log of reading 
materials expenditure can be interpreted as the percentage change of electricity consumption 
with a one percent increase in reading expenditure.  Thus, Model 1 suggests that an increase in 
reading expenditure by one percent would cause a household to change some electricity 
consumption behavior to reduce kilowatt hours by 0.6 percent, and the relationship significant at 
the 0.05 level.   
The direct negative effect of reading expenditure on electricity consumption is 
diminished in magnitude and significance by the addition of interaction terms or state fixed 
effects, but Models 2 and 3 still estimate a negative coefficient for log of reading.  With state 
recoding drops, responsiveness of electricity use to reading expenditure is 1.1 percent with an 
increase in reading material expenditure by one percent, which is the greatest estimates response 
in all models.  Again, if the elimination of incorrect state matches is significant and brings 
coefficient estimates closer to the true value, Model 5 supports my alternative hypothesis the 
most. 
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Though only the some high school and high school completion education dummy 
variables are significant at the 0.05 level in Models 1 through 4, a pattern of declining average 
electricity consumption relative to the reference level (no formal schooling and no high school) 
emerges.  An increase in income with higher education levels, and therefore an increase in the 
appliance portfolio, might explain the greater average consumption of all households except 
graduate degree holders compared to the reference level.  
In the second model, all but one of the interaction terms between reading expenditure and 
education levels are negative, which supports my prediction that education increases an 
individual’s ability to process information, though none are significant.  A negative coefficient 
for this interaction indicates that an increased education level has an additional negative effect on 
kilowatt hours consumed associated with reading expenditure.  An additional one percent 
increase in reading expenditure for high school or college graduates are associated with a 2.5 or 
1.8 percent decrease kilowatt hours, respectively.  The coefficient on the interaction term for 
advanced degree is positive, insignificant, and is smaller in magnitude than high school and 
undergraduate.  Perhaps advanced degree holders have less sensitivity to additional information 
if information has a diminishing effect on disutility. 
In all models, kilowatt hours increases slightly with the age of the household head, but I 
added an age squared term to capture a lifecycle trajectory, where energy use peaks mid-life 
because of a larger family, and decreases as activity in the house tapers off with age.  The 
interaction term between reading and age could differentiate individuals of an older generation 
who are frequent readers from the rest of their more conservative peers in terms of conservation 
internalization.  However, the coefficient is positive, which would indicate that older readers 
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consume less than 0.1 percent more electricity with each one percent increase in reading material 
expenditure.  This result, however, is statistically zero. 
The third model introduces the green pricing participation variable, which has an 
unexpected positive coefficient and is also insignificant.8  The coefficient can be interpreted as 
the average change in electricity consumption in households in response to an increase in one 
percent green pricing participation in the same state.  Preliminary analyses found it to be strongly 
significant and negative before the clustering of observations by household, so the inflated 
significance must have originated with strong correlations within households across quarters, and 
the addition of the age of the building changed its sign.  The result could be a similar response to 
the increase in net electricity consumption observed by Jacobsen et al. (2011).   
Across all models, the own price elasticity, income elasticity, and effect of increased 
percent of reading expenditure maintained the same magnitude and significance.  The results 
strongly support a negative effect of reading expenditure on electricity consumption, and weakly 
support a decline in electricity use as education level of the household head rises.  However, I 
cannot conclude that green pricing participation rate by state has a significant correlation with 
electricity use among households of that state.  A particularly interesting result that interactions 
between reading material expenditure and education levels are increasingly negative as education 
rose because higher levels of education, as Grossman (1972) hypothesized, increase an 
individual’s ability to process information, so the sensitivity to climate change messages would 
increase in addition to greater likelihood of encountering information about the greenhouse gas 
effect.  
Though the results of my study do support my hypothesis that information induces 
households to conserve, the magnitude of this effect is still dwarfed by price responsiveness.  
                                                          
8
 An F-test found the contribution of green pricing participation to the model to be meaningless. 
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Take for example the average household that spends $332 per quarter on electricity, and $52 on 
reading materials.  If the household increased their expenditure of reading materials by one 
dollar, they would decrease their kilowatt hour use by 0.4, whereas if the same amount of 
electricity cost one dollar more, they would conserve 4.4 kilowatt hours.  Though the average 
household response to price is 10 times the response to reading expenditure of the same dollar 
amount, compared to the average electricity consumption use per quarter of 3590 kilowatt hours, 
neither option seems likely to change behavior greatly.  For policy concerns, price 
responsiveness might be more effective, unless more targeted and abundant information could 
increase the likelihood of behavior change. 
VI. Caveats 
The significance of reading material expenditure as an explanatory variable for electricity 
consumption seems to support the theoretical framework of this paper.  However, this conclusion 
must be considered in light of a number of caveats in the case that the variable is significant 
through a different mechanism than through disutility from knowledge of negative externalities 
of electricity consumption.  As stated previously, the measure of income is quarterly 
consumption, not annual income.  The Consumer Expenditure Survey does not specify what kind 
of published reading material is reported, so there is no guarantee that the household purchases 
media that presents current events, that the household members encounter news stories about 
climate change, or that the household members even pay attention to media coverage of climate 
change. 
Furthermore, exposure also does not necessarily lead to behavior change.  Awareness 
may only lead to willful ignorance as has been the case in the United States because of how 
politically polarized the issue of climate change has become (Weart 2008). 
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A major limitation of my specification model is that I do not correct for selectivity bias.  
Ordinary least squared analysis is biased in this case because the error term is effectively a 
function of appliance choice.  The household preferences that precipitate a particular electronic 
appliance purchase are also likely to dictate a higher intensity of electricity use through that 
appliance, for example, a room air conditioner.  I identify a number of endogeniety problems 
here.  Appliance choice can be determined by unobservable preferences, income, education, and 
information.  I include dummy variables for type of heating and water heating systems as a rough 
correction. 
Appliance selectivity bias may also occur when an individual is more likely to estimate 
paybacks from more efficient appliances, for example, if they have a higher level of 
education.  Household income can also affect electric appliance decisions because households 
with greater income may be able to spend more for appliances that last longer or are more energy 
efficient. 
VII. Conclusions 
In this paper I estimate the effect of three explanatory variables that would support the 
hypothesis that disutility occurs in households that have internalized information about the 
connection between electricity consumption externalities and human-driven climate change.  A 
household’s reading materials expenditure, which represents the probability that a household 
would encounter news media about climate change, has a consistently negative effect on 
household kilowatt hour consumption.  Increases in education level, though not all indicator 
variables were significant, tend to be associated with an initial increase in electricity 
consumption with respect to the reference level of no formal schooling.  Compared to the 
reference level of no high school education, average electricity use drops as education rises.  
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Additional educational attainment represents an increase in an individual’s ability to process, and 
can also represent unobservable preferences of an individual to seek information.  Interaction 
terms with education level and reading suggest that individuals are increasingly sensitive to 
information with higher levels of education, but diminishing effects of information appear at the 
graduate degree level.   Lastly, “green” electricity pricing program participation rates per capita 
among states, which would indicate a social norm pressure to reduce electricity consumption, 
was insignificant. 
My theoretical framework is supported at least by the significance of the reading 
expenditure variable, which proxies the level of information available to the household, and the 
negative effects of education on average household electricity use.  My results suggest that 
households perceive the negative externalities electricity consumption as a contribution to a 
public “bad”, and derive disutility from electricity consumption.  A good associated with a 
perceived public good or bad is different from goods that carry potential private costs because 
individuals can’t accurate measure, and therefore usually overestimate, their contribution to the 
public good or bad. 
However, the results of my model imply that price changes still have the greater negative 
effect on electricity consumption behavior than information.  If the goal is to reduce residential 
energy consumption, an increase in price change will be effective, but the incidence will be 
highly regressive because the income elasticity is near zero.  However, in cases such as the 
California energy crisis in 2001, as analyzed by Reiss and White (2008), education campaigns do 
have an effect if the information is available and targeted.   
These results are subject to several limitations.  Though the proxy coefficients identified 
for this analysis were the expected sign according to theory and significant, the connection is 
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tenuous.  An increase in expenditure in reading materials is no guarantee that the household will 
encounter or internalize messages promoting carbon neutrality.  The negative coefficient on both 
main explanatory variables may be the cause of unobserved effects of education or readership.  
Education may cause an individual to value substitute goods to household services provided, or 
to budget more consciously to save money on electricity.  Though the estimation of education 
dummy variables indicates that the household electricity consumption generally decreases with 
higher levels of education, the percentage change in kilowatt hour for each level of education is 
negligible realistically though the model’s coefficient is significant.   
A final limitation is that my analysis does not correct for selectivity bias as described by 
Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Train (1986).  Ordinary least squares attributes variation in the 
sample caused by household preferences to the coefficient of price. Without Dubin and 
McFadden’s correction, appliance choice selectivity bias may have caused the price elasticity 
estimates to be greater in magnitude than the true coefficient.  The approach within my capability 
to correct this error would be to use a two-stage approach.  I would first estimate the probability 
of a household choosing electric water heating, space heating, or other appliances using the 
instrumental variable of when the house was built.  Though this variable is imperfect because the 
age of a residence will be negatively correlated with its energy efficiency, the era the house was 
constructed might be a high predictor of whether the prevailing heating technology or 
availability was natural gas or electric.  Train (1986) elaborates on similar selectivity bias found 
in the use of automobiles. 
Future research for this topic would need to correct for selectivity bias by using 
instrumental exogenous variables to predict the choice of electric central heating and electric 
water heating.  Potential instrumental variables could include the capital cost of electric or 
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natural gas systems or the year the residence was built.  Further analysis could also identify a 
more fitting explanatory variable to accurately describe the pervasiveness of energy conservation 
by state, or could use a different household-level data set specific to electricity use and habits 
closely related to environmental awareness such as recycling.  Also, this analysis could be 
replicated using additional years of the CEX to create an opportunity to follow variation in the 
diffusion of carbon neutrality messages in popular media over time.  An exogenous variable of 
charitable contributions may also be a helpful factor to indicate households that may experience 
disutility from knowledge of externalities that do not directly inflict a cost.  Lastly, interaction 
terms between population size indicator variables and the explanatory variables might be able to 
find a relationship supporting the pressures of social norms on household energy use. 
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IX. Tables 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Kilowatt Hours 29729 3592.83 2527.71 5.98 38249.04 
Price per Kilowatt (cents) 29729 9.68 2.54 5.86 22.54 
Price of Natural Gas ($ per ft3 x 103) 29729 14.13 4.07 5.08 33.07 
Total Expenditure ($) 29729 14498.92 12443.76 82.45 266148.90 
Reading Expenditure ($) 29729 52.85 144.04 0 8193 
No High School (%) 29729 0.03 0.17 - - 
Some High School (%) 29729 0.06 0.25 - - 
High School (%) 29729 0.21 0.41 - - 
College Degree (%) 29729 0.54 0.50 - - 
Graduate Degree (%) 29729 0.16 0.36 - - 
Green Pricing Participants 29729 29217.47 61998.14 0 360398 
Green Pricing Participation Rate 29729 0.003 0.006 0 0.03 
Age of Building (years) 29729 37.54 29.91 1 286 
Age of Household Head 29729 53.03 16.01 16 86 
Cooling Degree Days 29729 340.22 435.16 0 1876 
Heating Degree Days 29729 997.05 1002.39 0 4024 
Family Size 29729 2.58 1.43 1 12 
Northeast (%) 29729 0.15 0.36 - - 
Midwest (%) 29729 0.22 0.42 - - 
South (%) 29729 0.36 0.48 - - 
West (%) 29729 0.27 0.44 - - 
Population > 4 million (%) 29729 0.31 0.46 - - 
Population 1.20-4 million (%) 29729 0.27 0.44 - - 
Population 0.33-1.19 million (%) 29729 0.18 0.39 - - 
Population 125-329.9 thousand (%) 29729 0.16 0.36 - - 
Population  < 125 thousand (%) 29729 0.08 0.28 - - 
Tenure (%) 29729 0.25 0.43 - - 
Electric Heating (%) 29729 0.32 0.47 - - 
Electric Water Heating (%) 29729 0.86 0.35 - - 
Number of Rooms 29729 6.62 2.17 1 25 
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The dependent variable is log kilowatt hours for the quarter. 
In parentheses are t-values. 
The omitted categories are no high school, region West, and City Size 5. 
* less than 0.05 p-value. 
** less than 0.01 p-value. 
C
 Model controls for fixed effects by state and quarter, coefficients not listed. 
R Model drops recoded state data points. 
Variable 1 2 3 4C 5CR 
Log of Price 
 
-0.41** 
(-9.62) 
-0.40** 
(-9.6) 
-0.41** 
(-9.6) 
-0.37** 
(-2.66) 
-0.78** 
(-4.66) 
Log of Total Expenditure 
 
0.23** 
(16.31) 
0.23** 
(16.35) 
0.23 
(16.31) 
0.23** 
(17.29) 
0.21** 
(11.75) 
Log of Natural Gas Price 
 
0.12** 
(4.68) 
0.11** 
(4.65) 
0.13** 
(4.68) 
0.13** 
(5.91) 
0.41** 
(6.23) 
Log of Reading Exp. 
 
-0.006* 
(-1.99) 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
-0.006* 
(-1.99) 
-0.003 
(-1.04) 
-0.01* 
(-2.51) 
Some High School 
 
0.10* 
(2.25) 
0.10* 
(2.14) 
0.10* 
(2.25) 
0.11* 
(2.11) 
-0.0007 
(-0.01) 
High School Grad 
 
0.08* 
(2.14) 
0.25* 
(2.35) 
0.08* 
(2.14) 
0.08* 
(2.11) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
College 
 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.52) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.48) 
-0.04 
(-0.69) 
Graduate School 
 
-0.04 
(-0.97) 
-0.10 
(-1.87) 
-0.04 
(-0.97) 
-0.04 
(-0.95) 
-0.09 
(-1.44) 
Some High School*Read 
 
- 
 
-0.005 
(-0.22) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
High School Grad*Read 
 
- 
 
-0.01 
(-0.74) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
College*Read 
 
- 
 
-0.008 
(-0.41) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Graduate School*Read 
 
- 
 
0.01 
(0.56) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Green Pricing 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.28 
(0.22) 
- 
 
- 
 
Age 
 
0.02** 
(6.73) 
0.02** 
(6.71) 
0.02** 
(6.73) 
0.02** 
(6.79) 
0.02** 
(5.38) 
Age Squared 
 
-0.0001** 
(-5.52) 
-0.0001** 
(-5.71) 
-0.0001** 
(-5.52) 
-0.0001** 
(-5.59) 
-0.02** 
(-4.67) 
Age * Read 
 
- 
 
0.0004 
(1.86) 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Cooling Degree Days 
 
4 x 10-5* 
(2.43) 
4 x 10-5* 
 (2.42) 
4 x 10-5* 
(2.44) 
- 
 
- 
 
Heating Degree Days 
 
2 x 10-5** 
 (2.98) 
2 x 10-5** 
 (2.91) 
2 x 10-5** 
 (2.95) 
- 
 
- 
 
Family Size 
 
0.09** 
(17.27) 
0.09** 
(17.29) 
0.09** 
(17.28) 
0.09** 
(17.29) 
0.09** 
(12.74) 
Northeast 
 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
-0.0002 
(-0.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
- 
 
- 
 
Midwest 
 
0.14** 
(5.44) 
0.14** 
(5.58) 
0.14** 
(5.45) 
- 
 
- 
 
South 
 
0.35** 
(15.86) 
0.35** 
(16.06) 
0.35** 
(15.83) 
- 
 
- 
 
City Size 1 
 
-0.03 
(-0.96) 
-0.03 
(-0.99) 
-0.03 
(-0.93) 
-0.04 
(-1.16) 
-0.0002 
(0.00) 
City Size 2 
 
0.02 
(0.92) 
0.02 
(0.92) 
0.02 
(0.89) 
0.02 
(0.43) 
0.07 
(1.30) 
City Size 3 
 
-0.03 
(-0.97) 
-0.03 
(-0.95) 
-0.03 
(-0.96) 
-0.02 
(-0.57) 
-0.005 
(-0.08) 
City Size 4 
 
0.03 
(1.23) 
0.03 
(1.21) 
0.03 
(1.25) 
0.04 
(0.99) 
0.08 
(1.23) 
Electric Heating 
 
0.19** 
(8.59) 
0.18 
(9.38) 
0.19** 
(8.55) 
0.18** 
(7.83) 
0.20** 
(4.99) 
Electric Water Heating 
 
0.18** 
(8.65) 
0.19** 
(8.53) 
0.18** 
(8.6) 
0.22** 
(10.66) 
0.22** 
(6.98) 
Tenure 
 
0.19** 
(8.74) 
0.20** 
(8.80) 
0.19** 
(8.74) 
0.20** 
(8.89) 
0.18** 
(6.18) 
Number of Rooms 
 
0.12** 
(7.77) 
0.12** 
(7.88) 
0.12** 
(7.77) 
0.11** 
(7.31) 
0.11** 
(6.14) 
Rooms Squared 
 
-0.004** 
(-3.87) 
-0.004** 
(-3.95) 
-0.004** 
(-3.87) 
-0.003** 
(-3.38) 
-0.003** 
(-3.03) 
Age of Building 
 
6 x 10-5 
(0.28) 
6 x 10-5 
(0.25) 
6 x 10-5 
(0.28) 
6 x 10-6 
(0.03) 
-0.0002 
(-0.58) 
Constant 
 
0.02 
(0.12) 
-0.07 
(-0.38) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.34 
(-1.07) 
0.68 
(1.71) 
Observations 29729 29729 29729 29729 29729 
Adjusted R2 0.3971 0.3979 0.3971 0.4217 0.4195 
Table 3: Regression Results 
